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The international financial crisis and Belarus: Risks and policy  
implications 
 
Summary 
Currently, the international financial system is threatened by a severe crisis, which turns out to be the 
most serious challenge in decades. Starting in the US housing market in 2007, it spilled quickly over to 
financial institutions and capital markets in the USA and other developed economies, especially in the EU. 
Worldwide, policy makers have already reacted strongly in order to avoid a collapse in the financial sys-
tem, and to prevent a spillover to the real economy, i.e. a fall in growth and employment. For the au-
thorities in Belarus, this poses the natural question, how their country has been affected by the crisis so 
far, and what future risks lay still ahead. This paper tries to assess these risks and the associated policy 
implications both in the short and the longer term. 
Belarus as a small open economy is well integrated into the global trading system, and increasingly also 
into the financial system. With respect to trade integration, the world market price for crude oil is a key 
variable for net export dynamics. Similarly, other raw materials like potash fertilizers and ferrous metals 
are important linkages to the world market and determine trade balance dynamics. Regarding financial 
integration, starting from a low level, over the last couple of years the country became a more active 
borrower on international markets and attracted more FDI. 
Parallel to the international financial crisis, and to some extent also causally related to it, global commod-
ity prices started to surge. Energy commodities like crude oil, ferrous metals, and potash fertilizers (due 
to booming agricultural commodities) exhibited stunning gains, which positively affected countries that 
produced them (e.g. Russia). Taking aforementioned trade linkages into account, as well as the promi-
nent role that Russia plays in external demand for Belarusian products, Belarus has actually benefited 
from global developments so far. The still relatively low level of foreign capital in the country has implied 
no substantial negative impact on external financing conditions. However, taking into account the in-
creased pace of financial inflows into the country over the recent past, this might become a problem in 
the future. 
The trade gains related to the recent commodity boom should be considered as “windfall profits”, which 
occur in the short term. The challenge for policy makers in Belarus is now to use this favorable “window 
of opportunity” and tackle more structural, long-term issues. Some of the most important lesson from the 
crisis relate to long-term policies regarding the attraction of foreign capital and the financial sector. First, 
due to its many advantages, Belarus should generally preferred foreign direct investment (FDI) as the 
major form of foreign investment. Second, the crisis abroad has shown that a diversified share of FDI in 
the banking system (as opposed to short-term foreign borrowings) provides an important anchor of sta-
bility. Third, the country should not repeat the mistakes of other countries like Kazakhstan and overstress 
foreign borrowing. For this to happen, and to make the country more resilient to global financial distress, 
domestic capital markets need to be further developed, including the participation of non-residents. 
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1. Introduction 
The world is currently experiencing the worst international financial crisis in decades, 
which seems far from being over. A large number of financial institutions have in-
curred heavy losses and financial markets became highly volatile as a result. Around 
the globe, policy makers have already reacted strongly in several ways in the hope of 
avoiding a recession in their countries: while central banks have cut interest rates, fi-
nance ministries have adopted fiscal policy measures such as tax cuts to support their 
economies. 
The crisis, which had its epicenter in the USA, has spilled over quickly to other devel-
oped countries and to some emerging economies, including the CIS. By and large, no 
significant negative effect could be observed on Belarus so far. Under conditions of 
rapid financial integration with the world economy, it is only logical that policy makers 
and business leaders in the country wonder whether Belarus has passed the financial 
storm and avoided contagion for good, or if significant risks still prevail in the near fu-
ture. This analysis has to take into account that substantial changes took place at 
global commodity markets, which had a positive effect on Belarus in the short-run. 
In this paper we try to answer these questions. Part 2 gives an overview of the cur-
rent trends of integration of the Belarusian economy with the world economy in terms 
of financial and trade links. This analysis is based upon the balance of payments and 
summarizes some potential risks. In part 3 we revise the origin of the crisis in the 
USA and analyse its spill-over into the world economy, i.e. developed and emerging 
markets. Using the analytical framework established in part 2, parts 4 and 5 identify 
potential future risks for Belarus in the short term. The former part deals with risks 
related to trade in case a world-wide recession develops and commodity prices are af-
fected (real sector risk), whereas the latter part highlights the case when access of 
Belarus to international finance would be significantly restrained (financial risk). Fi-
nally, in part 6 we arrive at our conclusions and provide some more long term-
oriented policy recommendations for the Belarusian authorities. In particular, we focus 
on the structure of capital inflows, as a way for reducing the potential negative effects 
of the crisis on Belarus. 
2. Belarus and the world economy 
2.1. The balance of payments for Belarus 
The Belarusian economy is usually classified as a “small open economy”. The com-
monly accepted definition of a small open economy foresees it as “is an economy that 
participates in international trade, but is small enough comparing to its trading part-
ners that its policies do not alter world prices, interest rates, or incomes. Thus, small 
open economies are price-takers”. Notwithstanding the definition is mostly focused 
just on the trade flows, contemporary small open economies are assumed to be inte-
grated into the world economy not only through trade flows, but through capital flows 
as well. The latter is due to the rapid growth of capital mobility and development of 
financial markets during the last decades. Moreover, transition countries as a rule try 
to facilitate the inflow of capital by improving their investment climate and allowing 
legally a high extent of capital mobility. Hence, the majority of countries are involved 
in world trade and at the same time practice substantial borrowing (lending) from (to) 
abroad. These two linkages determine their dependence on the world economy. But 
while financial flows are more volatile rather than current (trade) flows, usually the 
impact of the changes in the world economy on the national economy begins from the 
financial linkages.  
The case of the Belarusian economy is not so typical in its reaction to external shocks. 
Due to the number of reasons, foreign direct investments (FDI) have not become the 
substantial item of the financial account. Furthermore, other “traditional” capital flows 
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have not been so significant for Belarus until recently. This can be seen from the 
analysis of the Belarusian balance of payments (BOP). In Appendix 1, the major cur-
rent and capital flows are presented as a share of the Belarusian GDP in 2007. 
While traditional sources of foreign capital (borrowings by financial and non-financial 
sector) are not so widely used in the Belarusian economy they are somehow replaced 
by the government’s borrowings and commercial credits. Borrowings by government 
in Belarus are mainly based on the bilateral intergovernmental loans and have no di-
rect relation with market tendencies. As for commercial credits, usually they are 
closely connected with export-import transactions and provided for the short-term. 
Hence, this kind of financial flow is also much independent on the financial market en-
vironment. Thus, the dependency of the Belarusian economy from the world one is 
much stronger based just on the trade flows rather than on the financial flows. 
2.2. Trade flows (current account) 
Changing conditions at the world markets (changing prices) may affect Belarusian 
economy in two ways. First, if the change in price is beneficial for the particular indus-
try then it will lead to a growth of export revenues.1 Second, in case of unfavorable 
price dynamics it will lead to a decrease in export revenue, either through reduction in 
physical volume or through price adjustment. For imports, the situation is vice-versa. 
So the dynamics of export revenues and import costs, i.e. the change in the trade 
balance due to the international financial crises is the first linkage to the Belarusian 
economy. However, analyzing a particular market we must at the same time consider 
both exports and imports. While the majority of Belarusian exporters have favorable 
effect for their exports, they may feel negative effects for needed imports. This origi-
nates from the high dependence of the Belarusian producers from imported raw mate-
rials and intermediary goods. 
Thus, we are to analyze the composition of the Belarusian external trade in order to 
find out which commodity goods have substantial share in the Belarusian exports and 
imports and hence changes in prices at which markets do matter for the Belarusian 
economy. Furthermore, the geographical destination of exported and imported com-
modities matters as well, while conditions of trade may differ substantially at the par-
ticular regional market and at the global market. In Table 1 main merchandize ex-
ported groups and the destination of their export are provided. 
Table 1: Main Exported Merchandize Groups  
and Destinations of Exports in 2007 
Geographical destination of export 
within the merchandize group, % Merchandize group 
Share in total ex-
ports, % 
Russia Non-CIS countries 
Oil and oil products 35.2 0.4 93.7 
Surface transport 11.7 63.0 15.7 
Equipment and mechanical devices 6.4 78.1 6.9 
Potash fertilizers 5.5 0.4 95.0 
Ferrous metals 4.4 38.0 58.0 
Electric machines, audio, video 3.1 77.1 15.8 
Source: Own calculations based on the Ministry of Statistics and Analysis. 
Table 1 shows that the main merchandize group – oil and oil products – is mainly ex-
ported to non-CIS countries (mainly the Netherlands and Great Britain) and hence we 
can argue about world prices at this market and about direct impact of world crude oil 
price on the Belarusian economy. Furthermore, the Belarusian economy should be af-
fected in a similar way by prices at the world markets of potash fertilizers and ferrous 
                                                 
1 For the short-term analysis we suppose that the quantity of production cannot be increased immedi-
ately, i.e. is inelastic. This assumption is rather realistic for Belarus in the short-term, while the rate of 
capacity utilization in major branches of the Belarusian economy is close to 100%. 
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metals. Other merchandize groups are mainly traded at the Russian market. Moreover 
mainly these merchandize groups are considered to be the goods of investment ex-
port. Hence, in this case the reaction of the Russian market of investment goods upon 
the international financial crises and correspondent impact on the competitiveness of 
the Belarusian goods will affect the Belarusian economy. 
Composition of Belarusian imports (see Table 2) shows that the country depends on 
Russian energy resources such as crude oil and gas. While gas is mainly used for do-
mestic purposes, its impact on the Belarusian trade balance is straightforward and de-
pends just on the price. The latter depends mainly on the bilateral agreements with 
Russia and until 2011 depends on the world prices only partially.2  
Table 2: Main Imported Merchandize Groups and Origins of Imports in 2007 
Geographical origin of import 
within the merchandize group, % Merchandize group 
Share in total im-
ports, % 
Russia Non-CIS countries 
Crude oil 25.2 100.0 0.0 
Equipment and mechanical devices 11.5 27.3 68.3 
Natural gas 7.5 100.0 0.0 
Ferrous metals 6.5 71.0 7.2 
Surface transport 6.2 14.6 82.4 
Electric machines, audio, video 4.7 32.7 61.8 
Food and meal products 4.1 40.1 39.7 
Source: Own calculations based on the Ministry of Statistics and Analysis. 
The situation is more complex with crude oil. Refinery oil products are partially used 
for domestic consumption, but mainly this business is export-oriented. At the same 
time, oil-refinery producers have a possibility to vary slightly the supply between ex-
port and domestic market depending on the current market conditions, taking in mind 
the total physical volume of the exported oil3. Furthermore, until 2009 the price for 
acquisition of crude oil is more related to the world market price, with some special 
correction coefficient in the Russian export duty agreed on a bilateral basis.4 Thus, the 
total result of the trade balance in oil business is very sensitive to the world oil price 
dynamics. Hence, the world oil price which is in turn extremely sensitive to the shocks 
in global financial markets is the first direct link between the world economy and the 
Belarusian economy. 
Besides the oil, Belarusian economy also exploits businesses connected with other raw 
and intermediary goods. Like in the oil and oil refinery sector, there are grounds to 
assume that world prices at these markets can be affected by the global financial dis-
tress. Among the merchandize groups stressed ferrous metals and potash fertilizers 
are of prior interest. 
From the point of view of trade balance, the situation in the sector of ferrous metals is 
rather similar to the oil and oil refinery branch. However, it is more complex, due to 
(i) the production line in this industry is rather wide and not constant, (ii) the propor-
tion between needed raw input and industry output may vary, (iii) a substantial part 
the imported ferrous metals are used as intermediary goods by other industries, 
rather than as raw materials by the Belarusian ferrous metal industry. But neverthe-
less the trade with this merchandize group may be the second linkage between the 
                                                 
2 For more details see Chubrik, A., Kruk, D. (2008). Scenarii razvitija ekonomiki Belarusi posle ener-
geticheskogo shoka: prognoz na osnove makroekonometricheskoj modeli [Scenarios of Development of 
the Economy of Belarus after the Energy Shock: A Forecast Based on the Macroeconometric Model], 
Working Paper of the IPM Research Center WP/08/01. 
3 According to the Energy balance agreement between Belarus and Russia, the latter takes commitments 
for import of 21 mt of crude oil per year. In practice this volume may fluctuate insignificantly. 
44 For more details see Giucci R., Kirchner R., (2007). Energy Shocks and Macroeconomic Management: 
Policy options for Belarus, IPM Research center Policy paper PP/02/07. 
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world economy and the Belarusian one, in case if the world price for ferrous metals 
somehow depends on the global economy financial trends, like oil price does. 
The next merchandize group of interest is potash fertilizers. This industry does not 
exploit regular raw imported materials needed just for its output. Thus the impact on 
trade balance through it may be considered as just the impact on the potash fertilizers 
export revenues. So, changes in world prices for raw materials (ferrous metals and 
potash fertilizers) because of the global financial distress might be the second linkage 
between world economy and the Belarusian one. 
Other merchandize groups important for the Belarusian external trade (see Tables 1, 
2) are mainly related to the group of investment goods. In brief the situation may be 
presented as follows: Belarus exports its investment production mainly to Russia and 
in turn imports investment goods from Western Europe.5 
2.3 Financial flows (financial account) 
Since 2007, when Belarus faced an adverse price shock connected with Russian en-
ergy resources, the necessity of attracting capital from abroad increased dramatically. 
It was consequent to the substantial increase in the trade balance deficit alongside 
with the policy task of maintaining an exchange rate peg.6 The policy performed by 
the government in 2007 led to a substantial increase in major financial flows com-
pared to 2006.7 FDI, borrowings by the government and monetary authorities, and 
commercial credits by non-financial sector provided major net inflows of capital during 
2007 (12.2% of GDP on a gross-basis). Moreover, 2007 was the year of the most ac-
tive accumulation of the external debt (capital flows other than FDI). In 2007 it al-
most doubled (the growth rate was 87.4% yoy) to reach USD 12.7 bn8, while interna-
tional investment position worsened by 45.2% to reach USD -8.2 bn.  
The dynamics of the capital flows was mainly determined by internal market condi-
tions and was only slightly dependent on the stance of global money and capital mar-
kets. First, FDI mainly depend on the political decisions on privatization deals.9 In 
their turn, authorities’ decisions about privatization seem to be made in case of lack of 
other sources of capital inflow. However, the investor side also matters here. For in-
stance estimation of risks by an investor determines the decision either enter the 
market or not. Furthermore the price, which is ready to be paid by the investor de-
pends on the international situation. But however at the current stage with a small 
amount of privatization deals we may argue that steady linkages between world econ-
omy and the Belarusian one based on the FDI flows seem to be unlikely. Second, bor-
                                                 
5 These linkages are indirect ones and assume analysis of possible reaction of Russia on the financial cri-
ses. Moreover, the adjustments of the Belarusian demand on the imported goods relates mostly to the 
medium and long-run. In this paper we mainly focus on the immediate short-run impact of the global fi-
nancial distress and thus consider this linkage in the context of Russian regional growth as a proxy for 
Russian demand on Belarusian goods and services. 
6 For more details see Chubrik, A., Kruk, D. (2008). Also see Giucci R., Kirchner R. (2007). 
7 Net inflow of FDI increased by more than 5 times, net inflow of other investment increased by than 2.5 
times. 
8 This figure includes the debt by the public sector of USD 2.0 bn (growth rate of 245.7% yoy), monetary 
authorities (USD 0.6 bn, growth from 0), banks (USD 2.6 bn, 72.9% yoy) and non-financial enterprises 
(USD 7.0 bn, 59.5% yoy). 
9 Increase in net inflow of FDI has been provided mainly due to a couple of particular privatization deals, 
i.e. JSC ‘Beltransgaz’, JSC “Mobile Digital Telecommunication”, privatization of some banks. Apart from 
these deals the net inflow of FDI was pretty close to the level of 2006 and was not substantial from the 
point of view of the Belarusian financial market. Hence at the current stage the FDI inflow to Belarus 
might be mainly referred to privatization related FDI, while non-privatization FDI provides only small in-
flow of capital. 
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rowings by the government are also mainly dependent on the political factors10, rather 
than on market conditions. Despite Belarus got sovereign credit ratings in July 2007, 
it has still not referred to public borrowings at the global financial market. Hence this 
capital flow in the Belarusian case is independent from the global financial distress. 
Third, commercial credits are mainly short-term and provided to each other by trade 
partners. Despite the conditions of granting such loans might somehow depend on the 
trends at the financial market (i.e. the discount rate, the length of the delay in pay-
ment, etc.) their overall availability seem not to be correlated to these trends in a di-
rect manner. Furthermore, while as a rule these credits are short-term, it means that 
the accumulation of outstanding liabilities cannot increase sharply during more than 
one year, while even in case of attracting new credits borrowers will have to repay 
previously granted credits. Hence this flow cannot be considered as the steady capital 
flow that depends on the trends at the global markets as well. Thus in overall it is dif-
ficult to say about increasing degree of financial integration of the Belarusian economy 
into the global one, while a substantial part of this capital has been attracted either 
for short-term purposes due to external transactions or for intergovernmental loans. 
Financial flows that are severely subject to global market conditions mainly limited 
with loans from foreign banks, made either by Belarusian banks or enterprises of the 
real sector. During the last three years, Belarusian residents have been borrowing 
from abroad more actively (see Appendix 2). 
Both agents of the financial (banks) and non-financial sector use foreign borrowing in 
approximately equal proportion (if considering outstanding claims). Nevertheless 
commercial banks may be related as more active and more important borrowers, 
while they mainly deal with short-term borrowing (up to and including one year) re-
acting at the demand for additional foreign currency inflow of the whole economy. 
During last three years the flow of attracted loans by the Belarusian banks has been 
increasing dramatically. Most often these loans are made by a consortium of foreign 
banks (syndicated loans), which is the common practice for the global market.11 
As for enterprises, their loans might be of more long-term basis (and form major part 
of those loans granted with the period over two years), while they are mainly con-
nected with their own foreign trade deals. Furthermore, in some cases these loans 
may be the part of the foreign trade contract, supposing the main deal alongside with 
granting loans by a foreign bank affiliated with the counterpart of the Belarusian resi-
dent. 
If one considers the distribution of the borrowed funds by the country of bank-lender 
origin, it can be seen that Belarusian residents mainly operate at Austrian, German 
banking markets (see Appendix 3). 
Thus, on the current stage we may state that lending from foreign banks became vital 
(though not critical) for Belarusian residents, both of the financial and non-financial 
sector. Hence, changing conditions of the access to foreign capital and conditions of 
lending (interest rate, maturity, etc.) due to international financial distress may alter 
this substantial source of the BOP financing. Hence, from a macroeconomic view it 
may affect internal currency market and can potentially lead to a decrease in foreign 
currency supply. From the micro view, it may lead to negative tendencies for Belaru-
sian banks, i.e. their lending abilities and their risk assumption. 
                                                 
10 In December 2007, Belarus succeeded to get loan from Russian government of USD 1.5 bn. Access to 
such kind of borrowing is mainly explained by political reasons and is not strongly correlated with market 
conditions. 
11 Priorbank being the member of Raiffeisen Group may be the exception from this rule, while it has got a 
possibility to borrow funds directly from its parent bank without establishing a consortium. 
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3. The origin of the financial crisis in the USA and spill-over to the global 
economy12 
3.1. Origin of the crises 
Housing prices increased rapidly in the US (“housing boom”) since the start of this 
century, fuelled by aggressive mortgage lending practices by financial institutions. To 
understand the origins of the current international financial crisis, it is important to 
stress the connection between these two factors, whose interdependency formed a 
spiralling effect in form of a "financial accelerator". An increase in housing prices 
raised the value of collateral for mortgage loans and led to the disbursement of fur-
ther mortgages loans. This, in turn, increased demand for housing further and led to 
another round of higher prices for housing.  
A major regulatory reason for this spiral is rooted in the underlying evaluation proce-
dures. In the US, the evaluation of property is done at market values, which creates 
strong pro-cyclical effects. In Germany, for comparison, not the market value is 
taken, but a long-term value of property is used as a base for lending. This creates an 
anti-cyclical effect, and mortgage lending cannot fuel a housing price boom in the 
same way as in the US. 
Structural changes in the US capital markets further facilitated this boom. Many hous-
ing loans were not kept at the banks' balance sheets, but sold immediately after origi-
nation to investors (off-balance sheet securitisation) in the form of (residential) mort-
gage-backed securities (MBS13). These investors included unregulated, highly lever-
aged and very intransparent hedge funds. Other new and complex instruments were 
created and used for the risk transfer, e.g. credit derivatives like collateralized debt 
obligations (CDO's14). A feature was the fact that such instruments were positively 
rated by international rating agencies. The originating banks released with such sales 
their own underlying capital, which was then used for originating new loans. This 
practise contributed towards a lax checking of (low) creditworthiness of borrowers by 
the originators, and eliminated incentives to monitor the borrower. In particular, the 
risk of higher interest rates (flexible rates!), and therefore of an increase in defaults 
on higher mortgage payments was not sufficiently taken into account by the origina-
tors. Consequently, a high number of mortgages were disbursed to borrowers with 
weak credit profiles ("subprimes"), with relatively high loan-to-value ratios.  
The actual crisis took its course when the Federal Reserve (Fed) started its tightening 
cycle of monetary policy. Rising policy interest rates implied that mortgage payments 
tied to this rate increased as well. Many borrowers were suddenly not able to service 
the loans anymore. At the same time, housing price growth started to slow down, 
eventually leading to a fall in prices. This deterioration in housing markets caused the 
following chain of reaction in the financial and real sector of the US economy. 
Effect on the liquidity of financial institutions 
Especially during the first months of the crisis, banks did not know to what extent 
they and other banks were exposed to subprime or similar structures. This uncertainty 
                                                 
12 This chapter draws on the policy paper W13 "The international financial crisis: Risks and policy implica-
tions for Ukraine" by Giucci/Kirchner/Movchan by the German Advisory Group on Economic Reforms in 
Ukraine.  
13 In the process of securitization, mortgages are packaged into pools of collateral, which form the basis 
of residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS). Different tranches of these RMBS are then sold to in-
vestors, with varying levels of priority on the cash flows generated by the underlying mortgage pool. 
14 A CDO is a security that is backed by pools of bonds, bank loans, or other assets. This may include as-
set-backed securities, RMBS, corporate bonds and other instruments. Again, these securities are divided 
into several tranches that have differing levels of credit tolerances. 
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affected interbank lending significantly, and interest rates went up. These problems 
had to be partly solved by the Fed through emergency liquidity provision. 
Effects on the solvency of financial institutions 
Depending on the form of concrete exposure to the subprime segment, the solvency 
of financial institutions was drastically affected. Significant write-downs had a nega-
tive impact on the capital base, with some institutions going bankrupt or being taken. 
Many banks were forced to take measures in order to maintain their capital strength15. 
Effect on the real economy 
A number of different transmission channels of the crisis to the real economy can be 
identified. First, a negative direct impact of the housing market recession on economic 
growth is already underway, as housing construction investments contracted. Fur-
thermore, the fall in housing prices could lead to negative wealth effects, as housing is 
an important part of household wealth in the US. Second, the problems in the finan-
cial sector have led to a tightening of lending standards. There is less room for new 
loans (“credit crunch”) to enterprises, resulting in higher cost of capital. This has a 
dampening effect on investment and consumption, i.e. on the major components of 
domestic aggregate demand. 
As a result, a recession or a major slowdown in the US in 2008 is possible, even 
though the data give not a clear picture yet. This depends to some degree on policy 
reactions, and policymakers are clearly responding in a speedy and encouraging way. 
Both monetary and fiscal policy instruments are currently actively applied. The Fed 
slashed aggressively interest rates and injected extra liquidity into the banking system 
in order to reduce systemic risks for the financial system. The associated depreciation 
of the US dollar has positively affected net exports. But also fiscal policy is clearly ex-
pansionary. Upon initiative of the government, the US Congress passed a fiscal stimu-
lus package, injecting around USD 150 bn (corresponding to 1% of GDP) into the 
economy. The near future will tell if the economy will respond to these policy stimuli 
in a positive way, preventing a deep and long recession. 
3.2. Impact on developed markets 
The crisis in the US spilled over the second half of 2007 quickly over to other devel-
oped markets, in particular in Western Europe and Japan. Over the last years, many 
financial institutions invested in such financial instruments issued in the US, or gener-
ated substantial income from them.16 Due to this direct involvement in those US mar-
ket segments where the crisis had its origin, the impact of the crisis on the solvency 
and on the liquidity of financial institutions has therefore spread in a quite similar pat-
tern:  
Regarding solvency issues, several banks announced high losses due to their involve-
ment in the US-subprime segment, which led to regulatory intervention and the rapid 
organization of a bail-out or a takeover by other banks (e.g. Germany, UK). Also a 
considerable tightening of liquidity conditions in money markets was observed. Banks’ 
mistrust of each other made them reluctant to lend to each other, and money market 
rates increased sharply. Major central banks around the globe were forced to provide 
punctually emergency liquidity to calm down market disruptions. 
Indeed, although many financial institutions in the developed world have written-down 
a huge chunk of their affected assets (reported losses of USD 193 bn up to March 
2008), this is unlikely to reflect the full extent of losses. The IMF estimated in April 
                                                 
15 This includes a combination of the issuance of new equity, a cut in dividends (or share buybacks pro-
grammes), the sale of non-core assets or – as mentioned previously – a cutback in new lending, leading 
to a "credit crunch".  
16 Globally active investment banks structure, underwrite, sell and trade such complex products actively. 
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200817 potential aggregate losses of USD 945 bn, i.e. close to USD 1 tr. Global banks 
account for around half of these estimated write-downs, while the other half is due to 
financial companies like hedge funds, insurance companies, etc. 
Effect on the real economy 
In the future, a threat exists of a spill over into the real economy. This spill-over could 
take place along two main channels: higher cost of capital due to a credit crunch, or 
via trade channels if the US falls into recession. 
The first channel, higher cost of capital, seems currently at play, as credit conditions 
are observably being tightened. However, while recent indicators are showing some 
deterioration in the economic outlook of several major markets, current growth in 
many developed markets (excluding the USA) is still relatively robust. The financial 
conditions of real sector enterprises are still fundamentally sound and do not currently 
pose a brake on expansion. 
The second channel, via trade, is potentially much more dangerous, as all major 
economies are quite open to trade and a recession in the US would lower their exports 
and hurt growth. The key question here is how long and severe a recession in the US 
would be, which also depends on policy responses. Currently, there is a high degree of 
uncertainty on this issue and a clearer picture will evolve in the near future. 
3.3. Impact on emerging markets 
Emerging markets were not directly exposed to the current financial turmoil, as their 
financial institutions did not have large holdings of US subprime assets. Consequently, 
the damage through subprime losses has been rather limited as compared to devel-
oped markets. The fact that emerging markets proved to be broadly resilient to the 
turmoil in developed markets culminated in the theory of decoupling. This view states 
that emerging markets have become far less dependent on economic growth in the 
developed world due to improved fundamentals (sound and improved economic and 
fiscal policy, high international reserves and sound external positions, strong growth, 
etc.), turning them into a kind of "safe haven" in times of global market turmoil. The 
key question is if this view is justified, and whether it will continue to hold going for-
ward. To put it another way, what are the possible transmission channels of the inter-
national financial crisis into emerging economies? 
While a direct transmission of financial sector turmoil did not take place, the indirect 
effects of this turmoil have already started to affect emerging markets. The observed 
increase in the cost of external finance18 and the reduction in the availability of exter-
nal funds19 are clear signs that turmoil in global markets has affected financial condi-
tions in emerging markets, even though conditions varied widely across countries. 
While macroeconomic fundamentals play a significant role, including the size of cur-
rent account and fiscal deficits, also the level of dependency on external financing es-
pecially by the country’s banking system is very important. This includes also a ma-
turity analysis of external financing. If the pressure on banks in developed markets 
continues and further worsens, another potential financial contagion channel for 
emerging markets could open up. Especially in Eastern Europe, the banking sector is 
often majority-owned by international banks, which continued to provide funds to 
their subsidiaries, sustaining economic activity. However, if the process of de-
                                                 
17 Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2008. 
18 This can be seen in the increase in country risk premiums (EMBI+ spreads or Credit Default Swap 
(CDS) spreads) starting in the summer of 2007. 
19 A significant drop in external debt issuance throughout regions (EMEA, CIS), instruments (especially 
Eurobonds) and types of borrowers (private banks) was observed. To illustrate this point further: while 
during the first four months of 2007 banks in the CIS issued 45 Eurobonds and attracted USD 15 bn, dur-
ing the same period this year there were just 5 Eurobonds issues, which raised less than USD 1 bn. 
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leveraging underway in global banks will lead to a cut in parent bank funding, the 
economic outlook will deteriorate. 
A further rapid increase in the cost of capital could result in significant financial and 
economic problems for countries with existing macroeconomic imbalances, as strong 
past economic performance was supported by large foreign capital inflows. Higher in-
terest rates and/or a sharp drop in capital flows exert pressure on economic agents, 
causing a deceleration of consumption and investment activity. If the exchange rate is 
fixed, and net foreign capital inflows are not sufficient to cover a possible current ac-
count deficit, depreciation (devaluation) pressure on the national currency will result 
in central bank interventions and a loss of reserves. In the worst case, a full-fledged 
currency crisis could develop. 
To date, observers remain quite optimistic regarding the ability of emerging econo-
mies to withstand the world credit crunch, although growth rates are forecasted to 
ease slightly. According to the IMF20, growth is expected to be robust both in 2008 
and 2009. At the same time, this forecast is subject to significant downside risks. If an 
economic slowdown in the US and other developed markets is observed, the real 
economy channels are to enter the picture. Even though high regional economic inte-
gration (e.g. among CIS countries with Russia as a growth engine) serves often as a 
stabilizing factor, no country will be able to remain completely insulated from such a 
slowdown. Here, the reliance on foreign trade and the share of exports to countries hit 
by the crisis is important.  
In such a situation, when the real economy is affected, domestic policy makers would 
be confronted with the dilemma of balancing between economic growth and inflation 
objectives. Starting last year, booming commodity prices21 – including energy and 
food – put significant upward pressure on inflation, especially in emerging markets, 
where such items account for much higher shares of their respective CPI baskets, and 
where exchange rates are sometimes pegged to a weakening US dollar. This led to a 
broad-based collapse in real interest rates, which might also serve as an explanatory 
factor why credit growth has held up relatively well in the region. However, rapidly 
rising inflation is a challenging environment for many central banks across the region, 
which requires tightening monetary policy and making the exchange rate more flexi-
ble. In the short-term, such measures could have negative effect on economic growth. 
4. Belarus and the international financial crisis: Risks linked to trade flows 
4.1. Global financial disturbances and changes in the relative prices of goods 
During the last couple of years, a tendency of growing prices at the world markets for 
raw materials has begun. This trend has become mostly evident for the crude oil 
price. There were a couple of reasons for this. The first group of reasons is on the 
supply side. There is a technological limitation in supply of raw goods. In regard to the 
majority of them, many suppliers cannot increase the production in the medium-term, 
because of the limitations in their production capacity. Furthermore a substantial in-
crease in demand for major raw goods led to almost 100% capacity utilization. One 
more reason from the supply side is the monopolized supply (for instance OPEC in 
crude oil production) in any form for the bigger part of natural resources and raw 
goods. The second group of reasons is on the demand side. The demand for major 
raw materials such as crude oil and metals has been increasing dramatically during 
the last couple of years. From the side of developed countries it was mainly due to 
                                                 
20  World Economic Outlook, April 2008. 
21 The relation between the international financial crisis, which is mainly centred on credit markets, and 
booming commodity (goods) markets is subject to much analysis. Possible speculation motives, as well 
as the weak US dollar might have played a role in driving commodity prices, while at the same time the 
overall good economic performance of emerging markets supported such developments.  
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economic growth and it was somehow correlated with the economic growth rates in 
these countries. As for the emerging markets (especially China, India and Brazil) their 
demand for natural resources has been increasing dramatically due to very high, re-
source-intensive economic growth rates. Moreover in some periods their demand for 
raw goods was even higher than their own growth rates, which is due to the techno-
logical changes in their economies and establishing new productions just in the 
emerging countries. Furthermore, due to high economic growth a share of consumers 
in these countries reached the level of income that might be considered as the critical 
one from the view of consumption structure. In other words, the households’ demand 
for gasoline in developing countries was increasing faster rather than their income. 
These tendencies give ground for the discussion about changes in relative prices for 
goods and commodities at the world market, i.e. that proportions between the price of 
good A and good B that had been rather stable for a long time, began to change. 
From a micro perspective, the relative prices may be considered as the most impor-
tant information that reflects consumers’ preferences and producers’ technologies. 
Thus, changes in relative prices signal about changing economic environment and 
changing proportion of different markets depth and demand potential. 
The dynamics of world prices for major commodities (see Appendix 4) show that 
rather substantive changes in relative prices began in 2005. The biggest price growth 
rates were specific just to raw materials such as oil and metals, while prices for non-
energy goods increased much lower. These changes could be considered as beneficial 
for the producers of corresponding goods. 
When the disturbance at the global financial markets started, the vulnerabilities at the 
world commodity markets increased. The main reason here was a decline in investors’ 
risk aversion and hence, a big amount of funds was redirected out of financial assets 
into real assets. From this perspective, natural resources seemed to be the safest real 
asset due to their role in the global economy. Furthermore, taking in mind its growing 
price trend in the world economy, investors may expect natural resources to be at 
least a non-risky asset (and in some cases more profitable than financial assets). 
Hence, many investors redirected their funds into futures and forward contracts on 
raw materials. This speculative motivation gave an additional push to the prices. Since 
the 4th quarter of 2007 this tendency has been strengthened by the depreciation of 
the US dollar. This linkage works in two ways. First, while major contracts for natural 
resources are nominated in US dollars, then its depreciating trend led to increasing 
purchasing power of those agents whose assets were nominated in other (appreciat-
ing) currencies. Second, it gave an additional motivation to those investors whose as-
sets were nominated in US dollars to redirect their funds from financial to real assets. 
Thus, at the end of 2007 and first half of 2008 global financial turmoil led to the in-
crease of prices for raw materials, making their prices in real terms higher relative to 
other goods. 
4.2. Risks concerning commodity prices 
Oil markets 
The increasing trend was most evident at the global oil market because this commod-
ity is one of the most liquid and the corresponding markets are of great depth. In pro-
jection to the crude oil market, the reasons of price increase since 2004 until the first 
half of 2008 may be concretized as follows.22 
− Strong world economic growth that drove growth in oil use. 
− Moderate non-OPEC supply growth. 
                                                 
22 For more details see: Short-term Energy Outlook Supplement (2007). Why Are Oil Prices So High? US 
Energy Information Administration, November 2007. 
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− OPEC members’ production decisions. 
− Low OPEC spare production capacity. 
− OECD inventory tightness. 
− Worldwide refining bottlenecks. 
− Ongoing geopolitical risks and concerns over supply availability. 
Since the 4th quarter of 2007, a sharp increase in oil prices has begun - average world 
crude oil price has increased by more than 66% since September 2007 up to the May 
2008.23 It was mainly consequent to the financial turmoil and increasing speculative 
incentives at the global oil market.24 Thus, global oil market has become much more 
dependent on the stance of the financial markets and much more volatile. 
While Belarus is highly dependent on trade with oil and oil products, these price fluc-
tuations will certainly alter the Belarusian trade balance, i.e. export and import flows 
and thus will affect the foreign exchange market. In Chubrik, Kruk (2008) the projec-
tions for the trade balance with oil and oil products have been provided, which showed 
that the trade balance might be slightly positive in 2008 and 2009 under the condition 
of increasing the proportion of the oil products exported and directed at the domestic 
market. These projections were based on the projections of the price dynamics given 
by the US Energy Information Administration for the short-term (2008 and 2009) and 
IMF projections for the price dynamics in 2010-2011. However, volatile prices sharp-
ened the problem of adequate and consistent short-term projections.25 Mainly this 
problem is on the agenda in respect for the short-term projections that are suscepti-
ble to speculative motivations, while long-term ones are based just on the fundamen-
tal tendencies in supply and demand. Through this, under the condition of highly vola-
tile oil price for defining its impact for Belarus, the task of finding out the dependen-
cies between price dynamics and its impact on trade balance is more prior rather than 
the estimation of trade balance under the given price. Hence, analyzing the mecha-
nism of price formation for imported Russian crude oil and price formation for Belaru-
sian oil products26 (the same as in Chubrik, Kruk (2008)) we may derive a function of 
trade balance depending from the physical volumes of crude oil imports and oil prod-
ucts exports and the price of crude oil. For the year 2008 this function measured in 
USD is presented by the Equation (1), for 2009 by the Equation (2).27 
 ( , , ) 7.36 4.45 63.79F X Y Z XZ XY Y= ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅  (1), 
 ( , , ) 7.36 4.55 61.78F X Y Z XZ XY Y= ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅  (2), 
where X – market price for Russian crude oil (Urals), USD/b; Y – the physical volume 
of crude oil imports from Russia, mt; Z – the physical volume of oil products exports, 
mt. 
Partial derivatives of these functions show that change the trade balance in trade with 
oil and oil products is positively related to the price of crude oil. In other words, de-
spite being the country with lack of natural resources Belarus shows the dependency 
peculiar to exporters of oil, i.e. the higher the price, the higher the net export reve-
                                                 
23 End of period. Source: US Energy Information Administration. 
24 Also some increasing political risks should be taken in mind connected e.g. with Nigeria. 
25 For instance, projections for prices in 2008 and 2009 have been revised by the US EIA by almost 15% 
higher in Short-term Energy Outlook in May 2008 in comparison to the November 2007 projections. 
26 A couple of assumptions are needed to derive this formula. First, we assume that the dynamics of price 
for Russian oil Urals is identical to the average world crude oil price. Second, we assume the identical 
price dynamics for crude oil and oil products. Third, we assume constant proportion within the Belarusian 
exports of oil products between light and dark oil products. 
27 The difference between these years origins from the different special coefficient for Russian exported 
crude oil to Belarus. In 2008 it is 0.335, while in 2009 – 0.356. 
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nue. But however, while Belarus depends on both exports and imports, it will reach a 
zero level of the trade balance at a particular value of the price. If we fix the volume 
of crude oil imports at the level of 21 mt that is envisaged by the joint energy balance 
of Belarus and Russia, and physical volume of exports at 15.1 mt that is identical to 
the level of 2007, then we may find critical values of market oil price (Urals), which 
will result in zero net export revenue. For 2008 this value will be 76.11 USD/b, for 
2009 84.48 USD/b. 
However global financial turmoil led to the level of crude oil prices that is much higher 
rather than these critical values. According to the US EIA short-term projections, the 
average annual price of Urals28 might be about 105 USD/b in 2008 and 99 USD/b in 
2009. In this case, under the condition of the exported physical volume identical to 
2007, Belarusian trade balance on trade with oil and oil products will be about USD 
512 m in 2008 and USD 226 m in 2009. Previous projections of trade balance, based 
on the oil price projections excluding the impact of global financial distress were USD 
196 m and -32 m for 2008 and 2009 correspondingly. Hence, it means changes in oil 
prices that are connected with financial turmoil (alongside with other factors) and 
might lead to increase of the trade balance by USD 315 m and 258 m in 2008 and 
2009 correspondingly. 
Potash fertilizers 
As shown in Appendix 4, before the global financial turmoil energy goods performed a 
leading growth with respect to other goods. As for the prices for potash fertilizers, 
they grew during the last couple of years, but the growth rates were substantially 
lower than those of energy or metal goods. On the one hand the situation at this mar-
ket is rather close to other raw markets – strongly increasing demand driven by eco-
nomic growth especially in emerging countries alongside with limited production ca-
pacities. A couple of companies – joint Belarusian and Russian Belarussian Potash 
Company (BPC), Canadian Canpotex, Russian Sylvinit and German K+S – are the ma-
jor producers whose market share in overseas exports is more than 85%. On the 
other hand the performance of this market was distinct from other raw markets, 
showing more flat dynamics. The latter is mainly explained by the specific features of 
this market, for instance, its stronger connection with global food market (which is 
susceptible to some regulations) and trends in agriculture. 
But since the end of 2007, and especially in early 2008 the situation with the price 
dynamics changed at this market dramatically. To some extent, it was related to the 
global financial turmoil. First, again here was the impact of a depreciating US dollar, 
which is the major currency for contracts nomination. Second, this market was par-
tially affected by the sharp growth of prices in energy sector. It worked as follows. 
High energy prices and the lack of energy supply made producers to redirect some 
crops at biofuel production, which was one of the factors for increasing prices in agri-
culture and food production. An increase in food price led to the substantial increase 
in price for agricultural raw materials. Third, problems with crops and low inventories 
of food led some producers to increase volume of agricultural productions, which con-
sequently increased demand for agricultural raw materials, including potash fertilizers. 
The latter tendency is more peculiar for emerging market economies. In overall these 
tendencies resulted in lack of supply at the market, which led to more than a double 
increase in spot prices (during less than half a year) and revision of prices in long-
term contracts between suppliers and consumers. 
The impact of potash fertilizers price growth is rather evident for Belarus. While tech-
nological conditions within this branch do not assume any imports which price may be 
connected with potash fertilizers, then the impact is constantly straightforward, i.e. 
                                                 
28 For Urals projections we use the same growth rates as for the WTI in STEO. 
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the higher the price, the higher the export revenues (taking in mind limited production 
capacities). In 2007, Belarus (through BPC) has exported 4.35 mt of potash fertilizers, 
which gave export revenues of USD 1.3 bn. The average price of total exports was 
310 USD/t. The major consumers of the Belarusian potash fertilizers are China, India 
and Brazil, which acquire it based mainly on long-term contracts. Major part of supply 
to other countries is made at a spot basis, which assumes more flexible price condi-
tions according to real-time factors. Since the beginning of 2008 the BPC agreed new 
contract price in trade with Brazil, which reach about 630 USD/t. During Jan-Feb 2008 
the weighted average export price achieved 556 USD/t, taking in mind old prices on 
long-term contracts with China and India (about 270 and 330 USD/t, correspond-
ingly). In May BPC succeeded to fix a new price in contracts with Chinese and Indian 
producers, which amounted to 650 and 625, correspondingly. Furthermore BPC in-
formed about new price of 1000 USD/t starting from July 1st. According to this infor-
mation, we estimate29 a weighted average export price of potash fertilizers at about 
696 USD/t. Under the condition of the physical volume identical to 2007, the trade 
with potash fertilizers will give export revenues of USD 3.03 bn. In comparison to 
2007 it will give additional revenue of USD 1.68 bn. Hence, from the view of this mar-
ket the global financial distress led to beneficial outcomes for Belarus. 
Ferrous metals 
The dynamics of prices for ferrous metals is similar to other raw goods, having ex-
hausted its growth since 2005. Since the disturbances at the global financial markets 
it has got a new push to growth, though not so strong as in case of crude oil. Never-
theless, there is an explicit increasing trend at this market that impacts the Belarusian 
economy. However the impact on the Belarusian economy is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, increase in price leads to the increase in the export revenues, which is mainly 
formed by the products of primary conversion. But on the other hand, it means the 
increase in value of corresponding imports of raw ferrous metals involved in the pro-
duction cycle (mainly from Russia). Furthermore, Belarus also imports ferrous metals 
of primary and secondary conversion for own purposes, which also means increase of 
imports value under the conditions of growing prices.30 In this case the gross impact 
of changes in prices on trade balance may not be stable, while there is a probability of 
varying physical volumes of either exports or imports responding to price changes. 
Moreover, the price dynamics in different subgroups of ferrous metals varies substan-
tially. However, the analysis of past dynamics shows that the price increase of primary 
goods – iron ore – spills over to other subgroups of ferrous metals and in case of 
Belarus leads to negative effect for the trade balance (see Appendix 5). The negative 
trade balance reactions to increasing price is mainly due to higher growth rates of im-
ported raw ferrous metals rather than growth rates of exported price. At the same 
time the index of import prices (including all ferrous metals) is lower than those of 
exports, which implies beneficial terms of trade in respect to the whole group. Hence 
we may suppose that the increase in prices due to the global financial turmoil will 
have a negative absolute impact on the trade balance. However there might a positive 
relative effect resulting in lower negative trade balance relative to the total turnover 
of ferrous metals. 
4.3. Risks concerning global and regional economic growth 
Other major groups of Belarusian exports are closely connected with Russia. Russia is 
the major trade partner for non-energy export goods and hence the level of income in 
                                                 
29 We assume constant physical volume of exports in 2008 in respect to 2007. Furthermore we assume 
the constant share of exports to China, India and Brazil. 
30 Finally the physical volume of exports is much less than the physical volume of imports of ferrous met-
als, which determines negative trade balance on this merchandize group. 
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this country will determine their demand for Belarusian goods.31 Hence, global finan-
cial turmoil might have a negative impact in Belarus through affecting Russian eco-
nomic growth. The latter is the key severe factor for the Belarusian exports, which is 
evident intuitively and also has got rather good econometric specification (see Chu-
brik, Kruk (2008)). So the risk here might be formulated as follows: global financial 
market may undermine economic growth in Russia which might result in lower exter-
nal demand for Belarusian goods. 
Russian economy has been integrated into the world one much more than the Belaru-
sian one. Besides real linkages through foreign trade, there were significant financial 
flows, mainly revealing Russian’s borrowing from abroad. For Russian residents it be-
came wide-spread to become net borrower on portfolio investments and loans from 
foreign commercial banks. 
As shown above, since 4th quarter 2007 emerging and developing markets including 
Russia faced outflow of investors’ funds. This became a real concern for the financial 
distress of Russian financial agents. For instance, some analysts gave a forecast of 
mass bank runs on small and medium-sized institutions, and mass outflow of capital 
from Russia. But nevertheless capital outflows were painful for Russia, they have not 
become critical. The latter is explained by rather favorable stance of Russian enter-
prises that are mainly connected with raw and primary resource-extracting sector. 
Russian enterprises connected with oil (and other raw) sectors may exploit the advan-
tages of growing prices for natural resources. Furthermore, despite integration 
through indirect financial flows, investments of Russian banks and investment funds 
into US mortgage markets were not so big and hence not as painful as for Western 
Europe. Thus we may argue about relatively better outcomes of the world financial 
crises for Russia rather than for other big countries. 
Noting these tendencies for a couple of emerging markets, the IMF estimates the re-
gional growth rate for CIS countries and Russia as almost unsusceptible to the global 
financial turmoil. For instance, the revision of the IMF projections in April 2008 in 
comparison to those in January 2008 was negligible for the CIS region and Russia 
(and it was almost the only case of a positive revision by 0.2 percentage points).32 
Slightly negative consequences for Russia are reflected in slowing growth in 2009, i.e. 
negative revision of growth rates by 0.2 percentage points in 2009. Thus, we may ar-
gue about low risks for economic growth in Russia because of the international finan-
cial turmoil and hence low risks of steadily decreasing external demand from Russia 
for Belarus. 
The latter coincides with last trends in Belarusian foreign trade with Russia. First, we 
must admit that the growth rates of Russian imports in Jan-Apr 2008 was still rather 
high at 49.9% yoy, despite lower than in Jan-Apr 2007 (54.8% yoy). Furthermore, 
Russian markets that are most important for Belarus also performed pretty high 
growth rates. Russian demand for imported machines, equipment and transport grew 
in Jan-Apr by 63.8% yoy (69.7% yoy in Jan-Apr 2007), while demand for imported 
textile grew by 56.9% yoy (92.9% yoy in Jan-Apr 2007). So the capacity of Russian 
markets important for Belarus is still going to widen, though its growth rate might de-
crease gradually. From this point of view international financial turmoil doesn’t lead to 
negative outcomes for Belarus through Russian market, at least in short-term. 
                                                 
31 The second large Belarusian trade partner is the EU, but oil products consist about 70% of these ex-
ports. Furthermore potash fertilizers and ferrous metals form a substantial part of the Belarusian exports 
to the EU as well. Hence the impact of change in the external demand from the EU (for other merchan-
dize groups) due to the financial turmoil is not so influential for Belarus. Hence in respect to regional eco-
nomic growth we focus just on Russian market, which is essential for Belarusian producers (other than oil 
products, ferrous metals and potash fertilizers). 
32 See World Economic Outlook, April 2008. 
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However, there is a long-term tendency at the Russian market of investment goods, 
which assumes increasing competitiveness between CIS-producers and producers 
from other world (mainly developed Western European countries). It results in a 
gradual crowding out of CIS-producers from this segment of the Russian market in fa-
vor of producers from developed countries that are more compatible in terms of qual-
ity and technologies. The latter also corresponds to the growing incomes in the Rus-
sian economy. In respect to the international financial turmoil this tendency might 
strengthen, i.e. in conditions of adverse global environment and relatively beneficial 
stance of the Russian non-financial sector they will reorient on more technological in-
vestment goods. The data on Jan-Apr 2008 might support this assumption, while the 
growth rates of Russian investment goods imports from non-CIS countries are much 
higher than from CIS-countries. For instance, in respect to the market of machines, 
equipment and transport the growth rate for imports from non-CIS countries 
amounted to 65.9% yoy, while for CIS-countries it was only 45.4% yoy. In Jan-Apr 
2007 the corresponding growth rates were 71.8% yoy and 54.0% yoy. In other 
words, changing environment resulted at this market in bigger deceleration of the 
growth of demand from CIS-countries (by 8.6 percentage points) rather than non-CIS 
countries (by 5.9 points) and difference in growth rates between these two segments 
increased from 17.8 percentage points in Jan-Apr 2007 up to 20.8 percentage points 
in Jan-Apr 2008. Overall the share of CIS-countries in Russian merchandize imports 
decreased by 2.1 percentage points and amounted to 14.2% in Jan-Apr 2008. 
However, despite of a couple of negative trends at the Russian market for CIS-
countries, Belarus succeeded in increasing its exports to Russia with definitely high 
growth rates (44.8% yoy in Jan-Apr) that are the biggest ones within the whole CIS 
region (30.6% yoy in Jan-Apr). In 2007, foreign trade with Russia took place in condi-
tions of high growth of Russian markets, but Belarus was loosing its market share on 
major positions. Furthermore, for the first time during a long period, Belarus suc-
ceeded in improving its competitive positions at the Russian market, at least in com-
parison to other CIS countries.33 
Therefore, we may argue that the main tendencies at the Russian commodity markets 
have been maintained. First, there are still rather big growth rates of these markets, 
driven by high economic growth rates. Second, at the same time there is still a ten-
dency of increasing share of imports from Western Europe at the Russian market, 
while the same production from CIS countries is still loosing its market share. Third, 
changes at the Russian market gave a chance for Belarus to compensate its reducing 
market share by means of more intensive competition with other CIS countries. 
Finally, we may state that in 2008 Russian demand for Belarusian commodities is still 
increasing in absolute terms (though growth rates are declining in comparison to 
2007). Alongside regional tendencies, which are favorable for Belarus, it may increase 
its share at the expense of other CIS countries. 
5. Belarus and the international financial crisis: Risks linked to financial flows 
5.1. Risks with respect to foreign private borrowing 
In part 2 we have shown that borrowing from abroad by means of loans by financial 
and non-financial enterprises is not extremely substantial for Belarus as it is for ma-
jority transition countries. However, the amount of borrowed funds has increased sig-
nificantly in 2007. The major risks due to global financial distress here may be formu-
lated as follows: (1) outflow of funds borrowed in 2007; (2) lower (lack of) access to 
                                                 
33 The share of Belarusian production in Russian imports from CIS-countries increased by 3.0 percentage 
points to reach 32.0%. Overall Belarusian share in Russian imports decreased by 0.2 percentage points 
and amounted to 4.5% of total Russian imports. 
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capital by Belarusian borrowers, i.e. higher interest rates and shorter period of bor-
rowing. 
The first one has not become vital for Belarus (say unlike Kazakhstan) just because in 
2007 Belarusian banks and enterprises attracted mainly short-term capital in form of 
syndicated loans, which are mainly repaid according to a fixed schedule (see Appendix 
6). Furthermore, since the end of 2007, the intensity of borrowing through syndicated 
loans have declined substantially. Consequently the level of net foreign claims of the 
Belarusian banks that was declining34 during 2007 is hesitating at the rather stable 
level in 2008. 
This tendency is explained by the worsened conditions of borrowing for Belarusian 
residents. While foreign investors and banks began to classify investments in emerg-
ing and transition countries as much riskier in comparison to the investments within 
the developed markets, the interest rates for such borrowers increased dramatically. 
Furthermore, a crunch of liquidity was crucial at the world credit market during the 1st 
quarter of 2008. Hence, borrowing with longer terms also led to a substantial increase 
in the interest rate. But while there almost no experiences of transactions during 2008 
so far, it is difficult to verify such evidence in regard to Belarus. Moreover, there is no 
index of interest spreads calculated for Belarus, as there is no external tradable debt 
outstanding. For demonstrating these trends we may consider as a proxy EMBI+ in-
dex35 for neighboring countries such as Ukraine and Russia and also the total index for 
Emerging Europe (see Appendix 7). The EMBI+ indexes demonstrate that sharp in-
creases in the interest spreads over the benchmark were peculiar to the end of 2007 
and 1st quarter of 2008, which was unfavorable for new borrowings. Hence, Belarusian 
residents (especially banks) preferred to limit their borrowings from abroad under 
these conditions. 
Thus we may argue about materialized risks in regard to foreign borrowing, which led 
to worsening conditions of borrowing abroad. But in the short-term (2008-2009) these 
risks are not very significant. First, due to positive trends in foreign trade the neces-
sity of borrowing abroad, both by banks and enterprises, is not so urgent36. Second, 
the US dollar is the currency in which the vast majority of settlements on external 
deals are made, and thus Belarusian residents prefer to borrow in this currency. But 
since the monetary policy of the US Federal Reserve is aimed at liquidity provision and 
has being softened in terms of interest rates37, market interest rates in US dollar are 
decreasing over the financial turmoil development. Hence, for instance LIBOR interest 
rate in US dollars (12 months) has decreased during the year from the level about 
5.5% per annum, down to the level of about 3% per annum (see Appendix 8). It re-
sults in substantially more favorable absolute values of interest rates in US dollars for 
Belarusian residents. Furthermore, this tendency gives an additional incentive to bor-
row in US dollars rather than in Euros (interest rates on this currency are substantially 
higher). Third, in case of necessity there is still a space for new borrowing, while even 
higher interest spreads at the global credit market mean absolute values of interest 
rates that are relatively small in terms of the Belarusian domestic credit market. 
5.2. Risks concerning other financial flows  
Part 2 showed that among other financial flows, FDI and borrowing by the govern-
ment are the most important for Belarus. But both these kinds of financial flows have 
got specific features in Belarus. 
                                                 
34 Declining denotes to increasing borrowing abroad or to decrease claims on foreign resident. 
35 It denotes returns on national Eurobonds, Brady bonds and loans from abroad in respect to US Treas-
ury Bonds identical by the term of borrowing. 
36 But it may be much more vital in 2009, for instance in case of substantial increase in gas price in 2009. 
37 Currently US federal funds rate is 2% per annum, which is the minimum since 2004. It has been re-
duced gradually since September, 2007, when it was 5.25% per annum. 
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In 2007, an inflow through FDI mainly resulted from large privatization deals (see 
Section 2). At the same time, a net inflow from other FDI was negligible. It means 
that in case of Belarus, only a small part of FDI is susceptible to the conditions in fi-
nancial markets. In 2008 the situation seems to be rather similar, i.e. major funds are 
to be obtained through the next payment by Russian Gazprom for Beltransgaz, and a 
couple of deals in the banking sector, which has become a major placement for FDI. 
Furthermore, Belarusian authorities declared an agreement on the deal in the telecom 
sector in regard to the third mobile operator “Best” and auto maker (MAZ). However, 
all these deals are not related to the substantial risks, while they are based either on 
a strong incentive of investors to enter the Belarusian market (banks, MAZ) or par-
tially on the low efficiency of the sold state enterprise (Best). Hence, there is almost 
no risk of underestimating the price of these deals and outflow of such investments in 
the near future. 
However, since 2008 Belarusian authorities have declared an intention for severe im-
provement in the investment climate, which may assume attracting FDI in new busi-
nesses and sectors without extra profits. This kind of FDI assumes high competition 
level among neighboring countries and may be associated with some risks. Attracting 
such investments at the time of financial turmoil may lead to underestimated price of 
the projects and vulnerabilities of such investments. Hence, in order to avoid such 
kind of risks, at least further privatization deals should be thoroughly analyzed and 
prepared, which may shift them till 2009 or 2010 when the global economy might re-
store. Alongside wide preparation (i.e. legal and institutional changes) may be done 
just during the period of high vulnerabilities at the financial markets. Furthermore, we 
may argue that inflow through FDI will not be as urgent for the Belarusian economy 
as it was in 2007. Hence in 2008 risks connected with global financial distress may be 
avoided if targeting FDI under more favorable global conjuncture. But herewith we 
must admit that at the strategic level FDI should be the first option, which solves not 
only the problem of external indebtedness, but leads to the technological restructuring 
of the economy and provides long-run preconditions for its further perspectives. 
The situation with foreign borrowing is also rather specific. Despite Belarus obtained 
two sovereign credit ratings in 2007, there is not much progress in sovereign borrow-
ing by means of issuing Eurobonds. The main source of borrowing by the government 
was an intergovernmental loan obtained from the Russian government. In the context 
of the global vulnerability, the terms and conditions on this loan are definitely favor-
able for Belarus. The interest rate for this loan was fixed with spread of 75 basis 
points over the LIBOR on US dollar, under the condition of postponement interest 
payments for 5 years and with the maturity of 15 years. The same scheme on interest 
payments is valid for other intergovernmental loans. Hence we may argue that in-
creasing of sovereign spreads due to global financial disturbance will not alter Belarus 
from the point of view of existing liabilities in short-term perspective. 
However there may be some risks if entering the market of sovereign borrowing in the 
time of distress. But from the point of view of the consolidated budget and trade bal-
ance in 2008 a huge necessity of such borrowing is unlikely. Hence there is no need to 
accept extra risks. However, Belarusian government may accept these risks in a small 
extent entering the market just for the future purposes. In any case, a debut issuance 
of Eurobonds is usually associated with higher interest spreads, which will gradually 
come down during the next borrowings. Thus, for the purposes of using this instru-
ment of borrowing in the future, current conjuncture may be partially ignored and 
some risks might be accepted. 
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6. Conclusions and policy implications for Belarus 
Until 2006, international capital flows did not play a major role for Belarus. As a con-
sequence, the stocks of foreign debt and investment are still very low. This fact ex-
plains in part the so far limited impact of the international financial crisis on Belarus. 
But things have changed since 2007, following the rise in import gas prices and the 
start of a substantial "energy shock" on Belarus. The country needs to attract foreign 
capital to absorb the energy shock and to remain competitive on the global economy. 
A growing current account deficit, coupled with the goal of a fixed exchange rate puts 
this topic high on the agenda of policy makers. Accordingly, the flows of international 
capital have increased heavily, a trend which will certainly continue and even 
strengthen in the coming years. As a result, the stock of foreign capital is likely to in-
crease significantly in the near future, a trend that has already been observed 
throughout 2007. This in turn will increase the potential vulnerability of Belarus to fi-
nancial crisis in the world. Thus, one of the key questions for Belarus in the context of 
the current international financial crisis is how to avoid being hit by future global fi-
nancial problems, once the stock of foreign capital has reached high levels. In this 
context it is crucial to establish and/or further develop a system of monitoring of the 
main economic variables, such as credit growth, foreign borrowing, credit standards, 
asset price developments and the current account deficit. Such a monitoring could 
help to identify risks and could work as an early warning system. Below, we present 
three recommendations for making Belarus more robust against turbulences on inter-
national financial markets. 
Recommendation 1: FDI as the generally preferred form of foreign investment 
The decision to acquire companies abroad or to conduct green-field investments is as 
a rule a long-term decision. Thus, foreign direct investments are much less likely to be 
liquidated because of a financial crisis than e.g. portfolio investments or short-term 
loans. And even if the foreign direct investor decides to quit the country, the decision 
requires much more time than in the case of a purely financial investment. Besides, 
foreign direct investors in many cases have good access to finance and are less vul-
nerable to changes in the mood of financial investors, where contagion effects are 
wide-spread. If there are economic problems in the country, e.g. due to a recession, 
foreign direct investors will directly share the negative associated effects, as they will 
experience a drop in profits and dividends to be repatriated. This is in opposition to 
debt inflows, where interest payments have to be served regardless of the economic 
situation. Last, Belarus has a wide range of interesting assets that are still in the 
hands of the state. For all these reasons, we recommend to target FDI attraction as 
the main form of capital inflow to Belarus. 
Recommendation 2: FDI into the banking sector 
A large part of foreign borrowing is usually channelled through the banking sector. 
Domestic banks receive loans or issue bonds abroad and the resulting funds are used 
to provide loans to domestic borrowers. As a result, the financial situation of banks is 
crucial for the possible spill over of international financial crisis to other countries. 
The ownership structure of domestic banks is a key determinant for the magnitude of 
this spill over. Domestic banks owned by foreign banks are less likely to face a sudden 
cut in foreign borrowing or a major increase in interest rates than banks owned by 
domestic business people. It is not in the interest of foreign banks to stop providing 
loans to their domestic subsidiaries, because this would reduce their profits and mar-
ket share. Consequently, the attraction of foreign capital into the domestic banking 
system is a stabilising factor and should be considered as a priority for avoiding future 
problems in the financial sector. 
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Following the same logic, it is important to secure a diversified regional structure of 
foreign ownership. If a large share of the banking sector belongs to banks from one 
single foreign country, then financial problems in this country will rapidly spill over 
into Belarus. 
The so far positive experience of Ukraine in facing the international financial crisis il-
lustrates the arguments above. Foreign banks paid relatively high prices to acquire 
banks in Ukraine and are in no mood of restricting lending to them. Also the diversi-
fied regional ownership structure (e.g. banks from EU countries such as Austria, Italy, 
France, Germany, but also from Russia) has shown to be a stabilising factor. The 
negative experience in Kazakhstan, a country with a low foreign ownership in the 
banking sector, but a high reliance on external borrowing also supports the views pre-
sented above. 
Recommendation 3: Developing of domestic capital markets 
The current international financial crisis has clearly shown the risks involved with ex-
cessive foreign borrowing. While capital inflows into Belarus are necessary for macro-
economic and for structural reasons, the country should not overemphasize the role of 
foreign borrowing, here understood as borrowing at external markets and in foreign 
currency. Instead, it is necessary to further develop domestic financial and capital 
markets. The strengthening of domestic markets decreases the negative effects of 
turbulences at international financial markets and contributes to decreasing key risk 
factors in Belarus such as currency mismatches and high dollarisation. At the same 
time, non-residents will increasingly participate in such domestic markets, while carry-
ing the associated exchange rate risk. 
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Appendix 1: Major Flows between the Belarusian Economy and the Rest of 
the World, as the Share of Belarusian GDP, % 
 
Notes. Non-financial sector – non-financial enterprises plus households. Borrowings include items of other 
investments (loans, currency and deposits, other items) except commercial credits. 
Source: Own calculations, based on the NBB data. 
 
Appendix 2: Borrowings of Belarusian Residents from Foreign Banks  
by Sector and Maturity, USD m 
 01.01.2005 01.01.2006 01.01.2007 01.10.2007 01.01.2008 
Total foreign claims 635 1345 2223 3308 3406 
Total international claims 635 1066 1735 2763 2795 
Up to and including one year 403 675 1003 1685 1762 
Over one year up to two 
years 11 62 119 200 181 
Over two years 221 281 554 807 769 
Banks 466 472 859 1235 1407 
Public sector 23 61 71 76 38 
Non-financial sector 146 485 749 1389 1274 
Local assets in local currency - 279 488 545 611 
Net transfer of risk - -223 -313 -467 -433 
Total foreign claims on an ultimate 
risk basis 369 1122 1910 2841 2973 
Source: Bank for International Settlements. 
Belarusian Economy 
2007 
Export revenues 
Import costs 
FDI 
Borrowings by Financial 
Sector 0% 
4.0% 
2.4% 
1.7% 
Borrowings by government and 
monetary authorities 
Borrowings by Non-Financial 
Sector 
Commercial credits by Non-
Financial Sector 
0.4% 4.5% 
1.9% 0.2% 3.7% 1.8% 
61.7% 
67.8% 
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Appendix 3: Borrowings of Belarusian Banks  
by Domestic Country of the Lending Bank, USD m 
Domestic Country of the Lender 01.10.2007 01.01.2008 
Total foreign claims on Belarus, including: 3308 3406 
Austria 1404* 1663 
Belgium 47 45 
France 104 121 
Germany 1033 1013 
Italy 147 187 
Japan 4 4 
Netherlands 108 144 
Portugal 27 24 
Spain 16 23 
Sweden 4 3 
Switzerland 68 83 
Great Britain 4 10 
European banks 3048 3334 
Note. * - as of 01.07.2007. 
Source: Bank for International Settlements. 
 
Appendix 4: The Dynamics of World Prices at Commodity Markets  
(indexes, 2000=100) 
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Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF). 
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Appendix 5: Belarusian Trade with Ferrous Metals:  
The Dynamics of Prices and Trade Balance (Indexes, 2000=100) 
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Price of Belarusian Raw Imports** Price of Belarusian Exports*
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Note. * - total for ferrous metals (group 72 according to HS), ** - iron-and-steel scrap, imports from 
Russia (group 7204 according to HS). 
Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF), Ministry of Statistics and Analysis. 
 
Appendix 6. Interbank Syndicated Loans Borrowed by Belarusian Banks 
Bank-borrower and 
date of borrowing 
Sum, 
m 
Cur-
rency 
Bor-
rower’s 
rating 
Interest rate Term of 
loans, 
month 
Bank-lenders 
Belarusbank, 6.2008 45 USD - /B2/B- LIBOR+285 12 BayernLB, Commerzbank, 
BPS-bank, 5.2008 78 USD - /B2/B- LIBOR+320 12 Banco Finantia, 
BayernLB, Credit Suisse, 
Fortis Bank 
Belagroprombank, 
2.2008 
40 USD - /B2/B- LIBOR+310 12 Banco Finantia, Com-
merzbank, UniCredit 
Group 
Belinvestbank, 
11.2007 
41 USD - / - /B- LIBOR+330 12 BayernLB, VTB 
Belgazprombank, 
11.2007 
35 USD - / - /B LIBOR+288 12 BayernLB, VTB 
Belarusbank, 9.2007 105 USD - /B2/B- LIBOR+300 12 BayernLB, Banco Finan-
tia, Commerzbank, VTB 
Priorbank, 7.2007 100 USD   LIBOR+312 24 RZB Group 
Belagroprombank, 
6.2007 
1000 RUR - /B2/B- 970 12 VTB 
Belgazprombank, 
6.2007 
35 USD - / - /B LIBOR+325 12 BayernLB, Gasprombank, 
VTB 
Belinvestbank, 4.2007 11 USD - / - /B- LIBOR+365 6 VTB 
Belarusbank, 4.2007 38 USD - /B2/B-   12 BayernLB 
Belgazprombank, 
9.2006 
20 USD - / - /B LIBOR+375 12 VTB, Gasprombank, VTB 
Bank Europe (MNB) 
Belarusbank, 8.2006 65 USD - /B2/B- LIBOR+370 12 BayernLB, VTB, BTA bank 
Belagroprombank, 
8.2006 
30 EURO - /B2/B- EURIBOR+400 12 VTB, VTB Bank Europe 
(MNB) 
Belarusbank, 3.2006 38 EURO - /B2/B- EURIBOR+400 6 BayernLB 
Source: loans.cbonds.info. 
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Appendix 7: EMBI+ Indexes for Ukraine, Russia and Emerging Europe 
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Appendix 8: The Dynamics of LIBOR-rates in USD and EUR  
(3 months and 12 months) 
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